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Abstract: Article 8(1) of Schedule 1 of the Arbitration Act 1996 requires courts to stay 
proceedings brought on a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement except 
where there is in fact no dispute. The Court of Appeal in Zurich v Cognition interpreted this 
exception as allowing the courts to assess whether the defendant has an arguable defence to 
the summary judgment proceedings brought against it. By allowing the court to assess the 
merits of a dispute referred to arbitration New Zealand is inconsistent with the theoretical 
and international understandings which require the independence of international 
arbitration. Court proceedings on a matter referred to arbitration have the potential to rob 
the parties of the benefits of persisting with arbitration. It is therefore necessary to consider 
alternatives to art 8(1) which are principally, comparatively and practically sound. 
Key words: Arbitration Act, article 8(1), added words. 
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I PURPOSE 
Parties who submit their disputes to be determined by an arbitrator generally honour their 
agreement. Problems arise if one party can invoke the arbitration agreement simply in order to hear a 
frivolous dispute. In such circumstances should the courts provide an escape for a party who would 
otherwise be forced to proceed with a full-scale arbitration?  
In Cognition v Zurich Cognition claimed that Zurich had no arguable defence for refusing to 
indemnify Cognition under their insurance policy. 1 Despite an arbitration agreement, Cognition 
sought summary judgment in the High Court.2 
The claimant relied on Article 8(1) of the First Schedule of Arbitration Act 1996. Article 8(1) 
makes certain exceptions to the rule that the courts will generally enforce arbitration agreements:  
8 Arbitration agreement and substantive claim before court 
(1) A court before which proceedings are brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration 
agreement shall…stay those proceedings and refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that the 
agreement is null and void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed, or that there is not in fact any 
dispute between the parties with regard to the matters agreed to be referred. [emphasis added] 
Cognition’s argued its claim was brought within the exception to the mandatory stay of 
proceedings where there is not in fact any dispute between the parties because Zurich allegedly had no 
arguable defence for its refusal to indemnify Cognition.3 The Court of Appeal in Zurich v Cognition 
agreed with the High Court that the appropriate test for determining whether to stay court proceedings 
under art 8(1) depended upon whether a party had an arguable defence.4 Zurich argued unsuccessfully 
that the Court did not have jurisdiction to determine the merits of a matter referred to arbitration.5   
Three considerations are relevant to determining whether New Zealand courts should have 
jurisdiction to assess the merits of a dispute referred to arbitration. Firstly an understanding of why 
courts generally recognise the validity of agreements to settle disputes by arbitration helps explain 
why when the courts will no longer enforce such agreements.  
                                                             
1 Cognition Education Ltd v Zurich Australian Ltd t/a Zurich New Zealand [2012] NZHC 3527 at [3]. 
2 Ibid at [2]. 
3 Ibid at [10]. 
4 Ibid at [52] and Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd t/a Zurich New Zealand v Cognition Education Ltd [2013] 
NZCA 180 at [77]. 
5 See Zurich v Cognition, above n 4, at [76]. 
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Secondly the level of judicial intervention acceptable overseas is relevant to whether New 
Zealand’s decision to extend such intervention is justified. International consistency is necessary if 
New Zealand is to meet its international obligations and to facilitate dispute resolution through 
international arbitration agreements.  
Thirdly matters of policy are important in determining the readiness of courts to interfere. The 
promise of an escape from an arbitration agreement may be a false dawn if it substantially robs the 
parties of the practical advantages of persisting with their arbitration.    
This research will suggest that greater independence of arbitration from the courts is theoretically, 
comparatively and practically appropriate; and that this is true at least in regard to international 
arbitration agreements. Accordingly several alternatives to art 8(1) will be suggested.  
II THEORETICAL CONTEXT  
Zurich held that the courts may assess the merits of a dispute referred to arbitration.6 Is such 
intervention consistent with the reasons for why parties are allowed to settle their disputes by 
arbitration? Judicial intervention must be limited if arbitration is a contract or as an autonomous 
institution. Extending judicial intervention can only be justified if the state’s power to control the 
activities in its territory is clearly established. The theory which most comprehensively describes the 
present status of arbitration must inform the question of whether the courts may assess the merits of a 
dispute referred to arbitration.  
A Limiting Judicial Intervention  
1 Contractual Theory   
(a)  Definition 
The contractual theory argues that the legal basis of arbitration is contractual and that therefore 
arbitration must be conducted according to the parties’ wishes expressed within their agreement.7 The 
arbitrator is conceived of as the agent of the contracting parties with authority deriving from the 
arbitration agreement.8An agreement to refer disputes to an arbitrator for a final determination is seen 
as a legitimate extension of the freedom of parties to contract.9  
                                                             
6 See Zurich v Cognition, above n 4, at [77]. 
7 Reily v. Russel (1864) 34 Mo 524 at 528.  
8 Adam Samuel Jurisdictional Problems in International Commercial Arbitration - A Study of Belgian, 
Dutch, English, French, Swedish, Swiss, US and West German Law (Schulthess, Zurich, 1989) at 34. 
9 Kenneth S. Carlston “Theory of the Arbitration Process” (1952) 17 LCP 631 at 635. 
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If the parties’ wishes are paramount then the courts necessarily have limited control over the 
procedure and outcome of arbitration.10 If an arbitration agreement is a contract, it is a social 
imperative that the courts hold a party to their promise to settle their disputes through arbitration.11 
(b) Limitations  
There are difficulties with characterising arbitration as a contract. Kenneth S. Carlston describes a 
contract as an agreement that the contracting parties reach after a process of negotiation.12 An 
arbitration agreement however assumes that the parties will not or cannot agree on a matter.13 It 
assumes that negotiation is or will no longer be an adequate basis for regulating the conduct of the 
contracting parties.14 If contracts are enforced by the state only because they represent the 
crystallisation of the negotiation process; an alternative basis for the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements may need to be found. Carlston describes arbitration as a procedure or a method rather 
than an agreement.15 Arbitration may have a legal significance outside contract law.  
 The consensual basis of the contractual theory does not account for situations where the state 
makes arbitration of certain disputes compulsory or arbitration of specific disputes forbidden.16 In the 
interests of public policy some countries such as the United States have encouraged the use of 
arbitration to resolve labour disputes whereas a number of European jurisdictions have refused to 
enforce such agreements.17 This reality gives emphasises to the supervisory powers of the national 
courts over arbitration as explained by the jurisdictional theory. 
(c)  Judicial intervention 
The contractual theory argues that parties to an arbitration agreement voluntarily forgo their right 
to resolve their disputes in court and that the state should respect their choice to do this by staying 
court proceedings.18 Exceptions would be where the validity of the agreement can be challenged on 
procedural grounds generally available in contract law.19 This may be where the agreement is invalid 
                                                             
10 Hong-lin Yu “A Theoretical Overview of the Foundations of International Commercial Arbitration” (2008) 
1CAA 255 at 265-266. 
11 See Carlston, above n 9, at 632. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 See Yu, above n 10, at 267. 
17 Gary B. Born International Arbitration: Cases and Materials (Wolters Kluwer, New York, 2011) at 394. 
18 See Yu, above n 10, at 266. 
19 See Born, above n 17, at 340. 
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and cannot be performed.20  Assessing the merits of a dispute is a matter for the arbitrator to decide 
because such disputes are within their sole jurisdiction as has been expressed by the party wishes.21 
2 Autonomous Theory  
(a) Definition  
The autonomous theory would conceive of arbitration as part of a legal framework of its own. This 
theory has been articulated by Jacqueline Rubellin-Devicihi who stated that:22 
 Only an original system, free from both the contractual and jurisdictional notions, would permit the 
necessary speed and guarantees which the parties legally claim to be brought together. 
It follows that parties should have full autonomy to shape their arbitration and that the laws in the 
place of arbitration have no supervisory powers.23 Rather the parties should be free to choose what 
law applies to their arbitration.24 The choice of law is not limited to national laws. It can include a set 
of rules governed by custom or broad ideas of fairness and justice.25 Arbitration agreements and 
awards are to be enforced generally to respect the autonomy of parties to resolve their disputes in such 
a way.26 
(b) Limitations  
The autonomous theory has been criticised for discounting the importance of the place of 
arbitration.27 Francis A. Mann argues that there is no legal principle which allows individuals to act 
independently of the laws of a nation.28 It may be that the autonomy theory is subversive in the sense 
that it does not reflect legal realities. 
Mann also argues that if arbitration is to succeed in providing a final and binding determination the 
law of the land is the only set of rules with sufficient authority to enforce arbitral awards.29 Customs 
or general principles of fairness may lack the authority to be binding on the parties.  Resort must 
                                                             
20 See Born, above n 17, at 340. 
21 See Yu, above n 10, at 265. 
22 See Samuel above n 8, at 60. 
23 See Yu, above n 10, at 279. 
24 Ibid at 281. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid at 280. 
27 Francis A. Mann “Lex Facit Arbitrum” (1983) 2 ARB. INT’l 245 at 245. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
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necessarily be had to the national courts. It may be that arbitration currently lacks the capacity to 
operate fully independently from the courts. 
(c) Judicial intervention 
The autonomous theory does not recognise a national court’s ability to legislate to supervise 
arbitration seated in their territory.30 This would impinge on the autonomy of the parties to conduct 
their arbitration.  
B Extending Judicial Intervention  
1 Jurisdictional Theory 
(a) Definition 
The premise of the jurisdictional theory is that a state may regulate the activities carried out within 
its territory.31 The validity of an arbitration agreement arises from the fact that it is in the public 
interest to encourage the use of arbitration as a means of dispute resolution.32 In meeting the public 
interest the state must supervise how arbitrations are conducted and determine what disputes are 
arbitrable.33 
The jurisdictional theory contends that the power to settle disputes is generally the prerogative of 
the state.34 However if an arbitration is in the public interest the state will delegate this power to 
arbitrators.35 As delegates of the state, arbitrators must abide by the laws enforced in the place of 
arbitration.36 
(b) Limitations   
Supervisory powers of the seat of arbitration may restrict arbitration from becoming an effective 
means of resolving disputes internationally. Ole Lando argues that this is because of difficulties 
caused by the unfamiliarity of national laws to a foreign party.37 As an example he points to how the 
common law rules on consideration and privity of contract are foreign to those from countries with 
                                                             
30 See Yu, above n 10, at 282. 
31 Ibid at 257.  
32 See Carlston, above n 9, at 633-634. 
33 See Yu, above n 10, at 259. 
34 Ibid at 261. 
35 Ibid.  
36 Ibid at 262. 
37 Ole Lando “The Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration” (1985) 34ICLQ 747 at 748. 
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different legal systems.38 Thus the party from the seat of arbitration may have an advantage over the 
foreign party in an international arbitration when it comes to enforcing agreements. It is suggested 
that the application of a law that transcends national laws or the ability of the parties to choose what 
law applies to their arbitration regardless of the seat would avoid this difficulty.39 However the 
autonomous theory is a significant inroad into the sovereign of the state. The need for such action is 
mitigated by international agreements such as UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration which have promoted uniformity in the conducting of international arbitrations.40 
 (c) Judicial intervention 
If the jurisdictional theory allows a state to regulate the arbitrations that take place in its territory 
this would mean that a court should have a wide discretion as to whether to stay or allow proceedings 
on a matter referred to arbitration especially where it is the seat of arbitration.41   
C Conclusion 
There is a compelling theoretical basis for allowing courts to assess the merits of disputes referred 
to arbitration. This is manifested by the extensive control states have over arbitration. It is difficult to 
point to the freedom of contract as a justification for reducing judicial intervention. Arbitration is not 
the same as other contracts. It represents the failure of the negotiation process and parties are not free 
to arbitrate disputes which the state deems non-arbitrable. Arbitration’s reliance on national laws for 
the enforcement of arbitral awards indicates its current dependence on the courts.    
However extending judicial intervention is incompatible with international arbitration. The 
autonomous theory demonstrates that international parties need a flexible form of dispute resolution if 
they are to reconcile the differences inherent in their nationalities. 
 To meet the needs of international parties a distinction may be made between domestic and 
international arbitration. Courts are justified in assessing the merits of disputes referred to a domestic 
arbitration. While the merits of disputes referred to international arbitration are to be determined 
under the sole jurisdiction of the arbitrator.     
 
 
                                                             
38 See Lando, above n 37, at 748. 
39 See Yu, above n 10, at 257. 
40 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (United Nations Publications, Vienna, 
2008) at art 2A. 
41 See Yu, above n 10, at 259-260. 
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III INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT  
Arbitration agreements with New Zealand parties will seem less secure to international parties if it 
is unusual to allow courts to assess the merits of a dispute referred to arbitration. The defeating of 
arbitration agreements by recourse to the courts may be a tactic which is responded by with 
jurisdictional challenges. A universal consensus on the role of the courts in the arbitral process is 
therefore desirable. 
The New York Convention represents a multi-national effort to decide how international 
arbitration agreements are to be enforced.42 New Zealand’s obligations under this treaty will be 
considered first.43  
Malaysia has followed England in amending their legislation to prevent the courts from inquiring 
into whether there is in fact a dispute to refer to arbitration. The explanation for this movement may 
illuminate why New Zealand has chosen to do the opposite and to keep these words. 
In Zurich the Court states that claims that New Zealand is inconsistent with overseas jurisdictions 
are exaggerated and that a wide discretion over enforcing arbitration agreements is similarly granted 
to the courts in South Africa and Canada.44 The validity of this statement will be assessed by 
considering the academic opinion, law reform materials and case law in these jurisdictions.  
A The New York Convention   
The New York Convention provides in art II(3) that:  
 The court of a Contracting State…shall…refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said 
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. 
The commonly accepted interpretation of art II(3) is that the grounds of invalidity refer to 
“generally-applicable, internationally-neutral contract law defences.”45 This interpretation is 
consistent with the argument that arbitration agreements are no different from other contracts. It limits 
contracting States from imposing onerous or unusual procedural requirements before they agree to 
                                                             
42 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, (signed 10 June 1958, entered 
into force 7 June 1959), 330 U.N.T.S. 38, art II. 
43 New Zealand ratified on 6 January 1983 and the treaty would enter into force 6 April 1983. See UNCITRAL 
“Status - Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958)” 
UNCITRAL <http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html>  
44 See Zurich v Cognition, above n 5, at [73]. 
45 Gary B. Born International Commercial Arbitration (3rd ed, Klumer Law International, Alphen Aan Den Rijn, 
2009) at 710. 
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recognise the validity of an international arbitration agreement.46 The Convention’s goal of achieving 
uniformity in international arbitrations justifies such an approach.47 
The influence of the New York Convention in this regard and the similar provision adopted by the 
UNCITRAL in its Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration is also illustrated by the 
reform of arbitration legislation in England and Malaysia. 48 
B England  
Section 1 of the English Arbitration Act 1975 adopted the language of art II(3) of the New York 
Convention but imposed an additional ground under which courts could assess the validity of 
international arbitration agreements, namely where there was “not in fact any dispute between the 
parties with regard to the matter agreed to be referred [to arbitration].”  
In 1996 these added words were dropped on recommendation of the Departmental Advisory 
Committee on Arbitration Law:49  
These words do not appear in the New York Convention and in our view are confusing and unnecessary, for 
the reasons given in Hayter v Nelson.  
One of the objections to the added words made in Saville J’s judgment in Hayter v Nelson was 
based on the contractual argument that parties may choose how their dispute is to be resolved. The 
judge held that to allow a court to assess the merits of a dispute referred to arbitration would be to 
supplant the parties’ agreement to resolve their dispute through arbitration.50 The Committee 
explicitly identified inconsistency with the New York Convention as a reason for dropping the added 
words. This confirms that the effect of the added words was to limit the jurisdiction of the courts. In 
amending of arbitration legislation in England in 1996 thus recognises the contractual theory of 
arbitration and the desirability of international consistency between international arbitral regimes.  
C Malaysia 
Similarly the Malaysian Arbitration Act 1952, which was based on the English Arbitration Act 
1950, was amended in 2005 to prevent courts assessing the merits of a dispute subject to an 
                                                             
46 See Born, above n at 45, at 711. 
47 See UNCITRAL Model Law above n 40, at art 2A. 
48 Ibid at art 8(1). 
49 Departmental Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law Report on Arbitration Bill (February 1996) at 55. 
50 Hayter v Nelson & Home Insurance Co [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 265 (QB) at 268-269. 
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international arbitration agreement.51 It was hoped that this amendment would discourage the practice 
of claimants seeking summary judgment over referring disputes to arbitration.52 The Malaysian High 
Court has confirmed that this is the effect of the amendment, holding that:53 
 It is now no longer possible to argue that in respect of the controversy between the parties there is no 
"dispute" with regard to the matter to be referred to arbitration. 
D Canada 
Canadian arbitration legislation initially reflected the view that courts should have a wide 
discretion over enforcing arbitration agreements. The Alberta Institute of Law Research and Reform 
1988 report on Arbitration Law recommended that international arbitration agreements should 
generally be considered valid but made an exception in s 7(2)(e) of the Alberta Arbitration Act, RSA 
2000, C A-43 to refuse a stay of proceeding when the matter in dispute “is a proper one for default or 
summary judgment.”54 Section 7(2)(e) necessarily gave the courts the ability to assess the merits of a 
dispute in accordance with default or summary judgment procedure. 
Canadian courts have sought to limit the discretion of the courts to refuse a stay under s 7(2)(e). In 
Balancing Pool v TransAlta Utilities Corporation CJ Wittmann concluded that the provision required 
it to be proved that a summary judgment motion would be successful.55 In Smith Estate v National 
Money Mart Co Perell J demanded a less stringent standard holding that the motion had a “high 
prospect of success.”56 The reasoning of these Canadian Judges reflects Malaysian concerns that 
arbitration legislation gave the courts to much discretion over whether to stay court proceedings was 
inappropriately being used as a device to avoid the agreement to arbitrate.57 
In 2013 the Alberta Law Reform Institute recommended Alberta should repeal s 7(2)(e).58 The 
Institute accepted that since the parties have agreed to arbitration, the decision whether the dispute 
                                                             
51 Arbitration Act (Malaysia) 2005, s10 and Thayananthan Baskaran “Recent Amendments to the Malaysian 
Arbitration Act” (2012) 28 LCIA 533 at 533. 
52 See Baskaran, above n 51, at 535. 
53 KNM Process Systems Sdn Bhd v Mission Biofuels Sdn Bhd [2012] MLJU 1218 at [17]. 
54 The Alberta Institute of Law Research and Reform “Proposals for a New Alberta Arbitration Act” (October 
1988) at 75-76. 
55 Balancing Pool v TransAlta Utilities Corporation, 2008 ABQB 631 at 48. 
56 Smith Estate v. National Money Mart Co., [2008] O.J. No. 2248 at 143. 
57 Ibid at 143. 
58Alberta Law Reform Institute Arbitration Act: Stay and Appeal Issues 2013 at [84]. 
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should be heard in court is within the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal.59 It is clear that the general 
trend in Canada since 1988 has been towards the independence of arbitration. 
E South Africa  
Under South Africa arbitration legislation the courts maintain a wide discretion over whether to 
stay a dispute subject to either a domestic or an international arbitration agreement. Under s 6(2) of 
the Arbitration Act 1965 a court may stay court proceedings if there is: 
no sufficient reason why the dispute should not be referred to arbitration in accordance with the [arbitration] 
agreement.  
English and Singaporean arbitration legislation also uses the language of “sufficient reason” to 
confer discretion on the courts to decide whether to stay proceedings brought in regard to a matter 
referred to arbitration.60 However the discretion is limited to domestic arbitrations.61 South Africa’s 
arbitration legislation goes further to realise the jurisdictional theory by extending this supervisory 
discretion to both international and domestic arbitrations.62 
According to Desmond Williams the discretion conferred by the words “sufficient reason” has 
been interpreted as putting on those who seek to avoid an arbitration agreement an onus that is not 
easily discharged.63 One of the factors that the courts will take into account is the maxim pacta sunt 
servanda.64 The South African courts put weight on the contractual idea that parties must be held to 
their agreement to arbitrate.  
On the other hand the discretion conferred on South African judges has been described as “much 
wider” than is the case in other jurisdictions.65 David Butler asserts that there is a “clear need to 
restrict the Court’s powers of interference” into international arbitration agreements.66  
This view is shared by the South African Law Commission which has proposed an International 
Arbitration Act based on the UNICTRAL Model Law so as to limit court discretion in relation to 
                                                             
59 See Alberta Law Reform Institute, above n 58, at [82]. 
60 Arbitration Act (United Kingdom) 1996, s86(2) and Arbitration Act (Singapore) 2001, s 6(2)(a).  
61 Arbitration Act (United Kingdom) 1996, s 9(4) and International Arbitration Act (Singapore) 1994, s 6(2). 
62 Desmond Williams “South Africa” in J. William Rowley QC (ed) Arbitration World (3rd ed, The European 
Lawyer Reference, London) at 504. 
63 Ibid at 506. 
64 Ibid. 
65 David Butler “South Africa arbitration legislation – the need for reform” (1994) 17 CILSA 118 at 129. 
66 Ibid. 
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international arbitration agreements.67 The Commission hoped that this would bring South African 
arbitration legislation in line with countries such as England and Singapore and that international 
consistency in this regard would facilitate international business transactions in South Africa.68   
F Conclusion 
New Zealand is unusual in its decision to allow courts to assess the merits of matters subject to 
international arbitration agreements. There are clear movements towards the autonomy of 
international arbitration even within countries which have traditionally allowed the courts a wide 
discretion. For New Zealand, its inconsistency with close neighbours Singapore and Malaysia has the 
potential to disrupt alternative dispute resolution in the Asia-Pacific region. Arbitration agreements 
with New Zealand parties may come to be perceived as insecure.  
IV POLICY ISSUES 
When parties seek to avoid their arbitration agreement it is because of what they see as the 
perceived benefits of the summary judgment procedure. Is this a practice that New Zealand should 
encourage? This section will examine whether it is in the best interests of parties to an arbitration 
agreement to seek the courts assistance in determining the merits of their disputes. 
A Efficiency 
Arbitration may be a more efficient means of resolving disputes than the summary judgment 
procedure. Parties are free to agree on the procedure to be followed by the arbitral tribunal. This 
means that parties may, in the interests of expediency, agree to not hold a full evidential hearing.69 
There are limits to this freedom under art 18 of sch 1 which requires that “the parties shall be treated 
with equality and each party shall be given a full opportunity of presenting that party’s case.” The 
phrase “full opportunity” is generally read as only meaning “reasonable opportunity.”70 The freedom 
of parties over their arbitration procedure is nevertheless significant. 
                                                             
67 See Williams above n 62, at 503. 
68 South African Law Commission Issue Paper (Project 94) Arbitration: An International Arbitration Act for 
South Africa (1998) at 20-21. 
69 David A R Williams and Amokura Kawharu Williams and Kawharu on Arbitration (LexisNexis, Wellington, 
2011) at [4.13.5] and Arbitration Act (New Zealand) 1996, s 19(1).  
70 See Williams and Kawharu, above n 69, at [11.2.2]. 
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It is arguable whether arbitrations are in practice conducted with optimal expediency. Parties do 
not often take the opportunity to streamline the procedure that will govern their arbitration.71 In such 
cases the arbitral tribunal may decide on the appropriate procedure.72  
Summary judgment is itself designed to be an expedient process. The claimant need only prove 
that the defendant has no arguable defence.73 Summary judgment will generally not be available if 
there are material facts in dispute.74 Time is therefore not wasted on cross-examination and discovery. 
The need to determine complex legal issues in some cases may mean that summary judgment be a 
slower process than it may seem at first.75   
Parties to an arbitration agreement have the ability to choose an arbitrator to resolve their dispute. 
They do not have to deal with the potential backlog in the court system.76 This has not necessarily 
meant that finding an arbitrator is without delay. Ministry of Justice research has found that many 
lawyers considered appointing an appropriate arbitrator actually entails considerable delay.77 
Because arbitration has the potential to be a speedy form of dispute resolution one may presume 
that submission to arbitration would be less costly than to seek summary judgment. This argument 
may not necessarily hold in the cases of large-scale, complex arbitrations.78 But the fear of ever 
increasing costs is mitigated by New Zealand tribunals providing the option of fixed fee arbitration or 
an expedited procedure in certain cases.79 Nevertheless, from the perception of Alternative Dispute 
Resolution practitioners, arbitration is currently seen as having a “low-medium” potential for reducing 
financial costs.80 In the absence of comprehensive empirical evidence it may be difficult to make a 
general statement on the costs of arbitration vis-à-vis summary judgment.    
 
                                                             
71 Daniel Kalderimis and Andrew Skelton “Summary Judgment and Arbitration: The contest between 
pragmatism and principle” 17 NZACL 263 at 285.  
72 Arbitration Act (New Zealand) 1996, s 19(2). 
73 High Court Rules, r 12.2 and Jowada Holdings Ltd v Cullen Investments Ltd CA248/01, 5 June 2003 at 
[28]-[30]. 
74 See Jowada Holdings Ltd v Cullen Investments Ltd, above n 73, at [28]-[29]. 
75 Pemberton v Chappell [1987] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) at 4 and Kalderimis and Skelton, above n 71, at 280. 
76 See Williams and Kawharu, above n 69, at [1.1.5]. 
77 K. Saville-Smith and R. Fraser Alternative Dispute Resolution: General Civil Cases (Ministry of Justice, June 
2004) at [3.3]. 
78 See Williams and Kawharu, above n 69, at [1.1.5]. 
79 See the websites for the New Zealand Dispute Resolution Centre (www.nzdrc.co.nz) and the Building 
Disputes Tribunal (www.buildingdisputestribunal.co.nz). 
80 See Saville-Smith and Fraser, above n 77, at Infobox 4.1. 
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B Appropriateness of the Forum   
The autonomy international parties have as to procedure means that parties may reconcile their 
different understandings as to legal systems and philosophy.81 The ability to choose an arbitrator 
means that the parties may dismiss the concern that the dispute will be determined by someone with a 
nationality bias.82 The arbitrator’s loyalty is said to rest primarily with the parties.83 
One way the nationality bias of the courts manifests is in the fact that it may be difficult for 
domestic parties to bring legal action against international parties. An international party may object 
to the jurisdiction of New Zealand courts under r 5.49(7) of the High Court Rules. The courts have 
discretion whether to assume jurisdiction under r 6.29. Whether New Zealand is an appropriate forum 
is one of the considerations taken into account under r 6.28(5). Under r 6.29(3) a domestic party may 
also challenge the jurisdiction of New Zealand courts. In determining whether New Zealand is an 
appropriate forum the strength of the defendant’s connection with the country is relevant.84 
International parties may point to their geographical location as indicating their connection with New 
Zealand is weak.85 This argument is not necessarily available to a domestic party wishing to bring 
court proceedings against an international party. However, if an international party has agreed to New 
Zealand as the seat of arbitration, it will be difficult to maintain that their connection with New 
Zealand is weak.86 
Parties to arbitration have consented to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal.87 Therefore parties 
do not face the difficulty of trying to impose the jurisdiction of a domestic court on an international 
party. As a party to the New York Convention New Zealand will generally recognise arbitral awards 
which have been made in the more than 130 countries who have also agreed to the Convention.88 
Arbitration seems to be more an appropriate than the national courts for the resolution of disputes 
between international parties.  
                                                             
81 Julian DM Lew and others, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, 
The Hague, 2003) at [1.3]. 
82 Ibid at [1.13]. 
83Ibid at [1.23]. 
84 Wing Hung Printing Co v Saito Offshore Pty Ltd [2011] 1 NZLR 754 (CA) at [30]. 
85 Daniel Kalderimis and Nikolas Bruce-Smith “To stay or not to stay” (2013) NZLJ 232 at 234.  
86 Ibid at 234. 
87 See Samuels, above n 8, at 34. 
88 New Zealand ratified on 6 January 1983 and the treaty would enter into force 6 April 1983. See UNCITRAL 
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Commercial parties may wish to resolve their disputes without being scrutinised by third parties or 
the media. The New Zealand Arbitration Act addresses such concerns by providing a statutory basis 
for arbitration to be conducted in private and for presuming that parties have agreed to not disclose 
confidential information. 89 The presumption of confidentiality is reversed by s14F (1) in favour of 
open hearings when court proceedings are brought under the Act. If one party brings a summary 
judgment application under the Act they are directly challenging the confidentiality of the dispute. 
 The other party may respond with an application to stay proceedings. Under r 7.36 of the High 
Court Rules applications for a stay must be heard in private unless a judge directs otherwise. The 
courts willingness to protect confidentiality has been seen in how the High Court has considered that 
not only the fact of a stay of proceedings in favour of arbitration but also a pending application for a 
stay is relevant to its decision to decline media access to the court file.90 Nevertheless if the stay 
application fails summary judgment invites the sort of public scrutiny that a party to arbitration may 
not have bargained for or would have consented to. Court proceedings under the Act undermines the 
consensual foundation of arbitration and the added protection afforded by the presumption of 
confidentiality in arbitral proceedings.  
C Conclusion   
Arbitration potentially offers parties an effective dispute resolution procedure tailored to their 
needs. The benefits of arbitration are threatened if a court has jurisdiction to assess the merits of a 
dispute referred to arbitration. This is especially true for international parties. This conclusion is 
consistent with the principled and comparative arguments above. There should be greater 
independence for parties to an international arbitration agreement, but a case can be made for 
preserving judicial intervention into domestic arbitration agreements. 
V  NEW ZEALAND’S APPROACH FOLLOWING ZURICH v 
COGNITION 
A  Before the 1996 Act 
 Before 1996 New Zealand’s arbitration legislative scheme consisted of the Arbitration Act 1908 
which governed domestic arbitrations and the Arbitration (Foreign Agreements and Awards) Act 
1982 which governed international arbitrations.91 
                                                             
89 Arbitration Act (New Zealand) 1996, ss 14A and s 14B(1). 
90 Danone Asia Pacific Holdings Pte Ltd v Fonterra Co-Operative Group Ltd [2014] NZHC 393 at [33] and 
Ngai Tahu Justice Holdings Ltd v Attorney-General [2013] NZHC 801 at [14]. 
91Baltimar Aps Ltd v Nalder & Biddle Ltd [1994] 3 NZLR 129 (CA) at 135. 
18 
 
Under s 5 of the Arbitration Act 1908 the court had a wide discretion to refer a dispute back to 
arbitration: 
…the Court, if satisfied that there is no sufficient reason why the matter should not be referred in accordance 
with the submission…may make an order staying the proceedings.  
In Royal Oak Mall Ltd v Savory Holdings Ltd it was held that the appropriate test was to determine 
whether the defendant had an arguable defence to a claim for summary judgment.92 This necessarily 
involved a court considering the merits of a dispute referred to arbitration and thus reflected the 
theory that courts may supervise the activities that take place under its territory. 
International arbitration agreements were originally governed by the Arbitration Clauses (Protocol) 
and the Arbitration (Foreign Awards) Act 1933.93 This Act similarly gave the court a wide discretion 
under s 3:  
…unless [the Court is] satisfied that the agreement or arbitration has become inoperative or cannot proceed, 
or that there is not in fact any dispute between the parties with regard to the matter agreed to be referred shall 
make an order staying the proceedings. [emphasis added] 
In 1982 the Arbitration (Foreign Agreements and Awards) Act was passed which significantly 
limited the court’s discretion to allow court proceedings on a matter subject to an international 
arbitration agreement under s 4(1): 
…the Court shall, unless the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative, or incapable of being 
performed, make an order staying the proceedings. 
Daniel Kalderimis and Andrew Skelton contend that the repeal of s 3 was “to ensure that New 
Zealand legislation was consistent with art II(3) of the New York Convention” to which New Zealand 
was a party.94 The authors rely on express references in the Bill to the power to stay legal proceedings 
and the description of the New York Convention’s purpose as being to “avoid some of the legal 
shortcomings revealed by earlier legislation and conventions.”95  
The case of Baltimar Aps Ltd v Nalder & Biddle Ltd supports this view. In Baltimar the Court of 
Appeal held that the repeal of the 1933 Act meant that the courts could no longer look at the merits of 
a dispute referred to arbitration.96 New Zealand endorsed the contractual view of international 
                                                             
92 Royal Oak Mall Ltd v Savory Holdings Ltd CA106/89, 2 November 1989 at 9. 
93 Arbitration Clauses (Protocol) and the Arbitration (Foreign Awards) Act 1933, long title. 
94 See Kalderimis and Skelton, above n 71, at 270 and above at section 3. 
95 See Kalderimis and Skelton, above n 71, at 270. 
96 See Baltimar Aps Ltd v Nalder & Biddle Ltd, above n 91, at 135. 
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arbitration by limiting the court’s discretion to assess the merits of disputes subject to international 
arbitration agreements.   
B 1996 Act  
Before the 1996 Act it was clear that New Zealand recognised that domestic arbitration had a 
different theoretical basis than that which underpinned international arbitration. The former being 
justified by the jurisdictional theory, the latter being justified by the contractual theory.  
In this context it seems odd that in 1996 New Zealand would pass an Act that reinstated a wide 
discretion for the court to assess disputes referred to arbitration, regardless of it being subject to an 
international or domestic arbitration agreement.97 A wide discretion was enacted through the “added 
words” in art 8(1) which gave the courts the power to allow court proceedings if: 
 
 there is not in fact any dispute between the parties with regard to the matters agreed to be referred [to 
arbitration].  
 
It seems easier to justify in principle that a national court should have extensive powers to supervise 
the activities of its citizens. As illustrated above, this has been borne out internationally with 
Singapore and England giving courts a wide discretion to assess disputes subject to domestic 
arbitration agreements while limiting court discretion as to international arbitration agreements.98 It is 
harder to justify in principle that courts should assume a wide discretion over international 
agreements. It may be seen as an illegitimate extension of the jurisdictional theory, conflicting with 
the jurisdiction countries overseas have over their own citizens.99  
 
The added words in art 8(1) are inconsistent with the purposes of the 1996 Act to promote 
international consistency with arbitral regimes.100 South Africa is an example of a country with a 
uniform standard for international and domestic arbitrations. However its Law Commission has 
recommended following the UNICTRAL standard which incorporates the art II(3) of the New York 
Convention and which limits court discretion.101 As noted above, internationally, the general 
movement is towards the greater independence of arbitration, or at least in regard to international 
                                                             
97 The added words in art 8(1) are contained in Arbitration Act 1996, Schedule 1. These rules apply to 
arbitration generally. 
98 See above in section 3E. 
99 Yu may disagree; see Yu, above n 10, at 259-260. 
100 Arbitration Act (New Zealand) 1996, s 5(b). 
101 See Williams above n 62, at 503. 
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arbitration.102 New Zealand is inconsistent with international developments by assimilating 
international and domestic arbitration under the jurisdictional theory and this raises the issue of 
whether arbitration agreements with New Zealand parties will be looked down on as being unsecure.   
C The New Zealand Law Commission Reports 
The Court of Appeal in Zurich considered that the 1991 and 2003 Law Commission reports on 
arbitration supported the argument that Parliament intended that an arguable defence test needed to be 
satisfied under art 8(1) before court proceedings would be stayed in favour of arbitration.103 This 
section will show that this claim is based on an uncertain footing which does not taken into account 
recent international developments. 
 In 1991 the Law Commission recommended the inclusion of the added words. It relied on a 
passage from the English Mustill Committee Report 1990 which indicated that the added words were 
of “great value in disposing of applications for a stay by a defendant who has no arguable defence.”104 
The Court of Appeal says that this would mean that the “existing New Zealand legal position and 
practice since the decision of Royal Oak would continue under the new statute [of 1996].”105   
The English text The Law and Practice of Commercial Arbitration in England was first published 
two years before the 1991 New Zealand Law Commission report and as an author Lord Mustill with 
Stewart Boyd expressed ambivalence towards how the words had been interpreted by English 
Judges:106   
 
There are strong logical arguments for the view that bona fide if unsubstantial defence ought to be ruled 
upon by the arbitrator, not the Court. This is so especially where there is a non-domestic arbitration agreement. 
 
The views expressed by Lord Mustill and Boyd in their textbook suggest that the Law 
Commission’s reliance on the Mustill Committee Report can no longer be taken to have meant that 
the arguable defence test should continue to apply. The Court of Appeal itself refers to the English 
textbook to assert that the arguable defence test was “quite clearly established” law on how the added 
                                                             
102 See above in section 3F. 
103 See Zurich v Cognition, above n 5, at [68]. 
104 “A New Arbitration Act for the United Kingdom? The Response of the Departmental Advisory Committee to 
the UNCITRAL Model Law” (1990) 6 Arbitration International 3 at 53 and Law Commission Arbitration 
(NZLC R20, 1991) at [308]. 
105 See Zurich v Cognition, above n 5, at [69]. 
106 Lord Michael Mustill & Stewart Boyd, The Law and Practice of Commercial Arbitration in England (2nd ed, 
Butterworths, London, 1989) at 123. 
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words were to be interpreted and as a basis for the New Zealand decision in Royal Oak.107 But it 
seems that the Court has failed to read this ‘endorsement’ in the context of Lord Mustill’s reservations 
about the arguable defence test. It is suggested that the Mustill Committee Report be read in this 
context of these misgivings. 
Further there is the fact that the relevant section in the Arbitration Act 1908 under which Royal 
Oak was decided is worded differently from the 1996 Act and only applied to domestic arbitration 
agreements.108 The Arbitration Act 1996 has a different subject matter; it applies to both international 
and domestic arbitration.109 Mustill and Boyd were especially concerned about allowing Courts a wide 
discretion over international arbitration agreements as has been stated immediately above.  
The subsequent recommendation in 1996 by the Departmental Advisory Committee on Arbitration 
Law to drop the added words has already been discussed.110 It further illustrates that the reliance the 
Law Commission placed on the English position in adopting the added words must be reassessed. 
Law reform experts in the United Kingdom no longer support extending judicial intervention into 
international arbitration agreements. 
The Law Commission in 1991 also relied on the recommendation in the Alberta ILRR report 
that:111  
 
A Court be empowered to refuse to stay an action if “the case is a proper one for a default or summary 
judgment.” 
 
The Court of Appeal may be mistaken to rely on this aspect of the Law Commission Report to support 
the adoption of an arguable defence test. As discussed earlier the Canadian courts have interpreted 
this provision narrowly, requiring that a summary judgment claim have a high chance of success.112 
This is inconsistence with a threshold for summary judgment is merely an arguable claim. In 
recommending the Canadian approach it may be that the Law Commission was actually suggesting 
that the effect of the added words was to grant a court a level of discretion, but that the courts should 
be slow to exercise such discretion. This interpretation would be to take steps to align the added 
words with the Act’s stated purpose of reducing judicial intervention.113   
                                                             
107 See Zurich v Cognition, above n 5, at [34]. 
108 See Zurich v Cognition, above n 5, at [36] and above in section 5A. 
109 See above in section 5B. 
110 See above in section 3B. 
111 See Zurich v Cognition, above n 5, at [43]. 
112 See above in section 3D. 
113 Arbitration Act (New Zealand) 1996, sch 1 art 5.  
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In 2003 the Law Commission reviewed the Arbitration Act 1996. While the Commission’s report 
recognised criticism of the arguable defence approach it was not prepared to recommend law 
reform.114 Parliament’s acceptance of this report is strong evidence that Parliament intends art 8(1) to 
be interpreted as importing an arguable defence test. Law reform may therefore be necessary if this 
approach is to change. 
 
D Reasoning in Zurich v Cognition 
The Court of Appeal rejected the argument that it should stay proceedings under art 8(1) for a bona 
fide, albeit unarguable defence.115 The Court preferred the summary judgment test which asks whether 
the defendant has an arguable defence.116 The argument for a bona fide test was rejected as being an 
argument for what the “New Zealand Parliament should have enacted, as opposed to what it did 
enact.”117  
By adopting the arguable defence test the New Zealand courts have given further recognition to the 
jurisdictional theory as a basis for international and domestic arbitration. This threshold makes it 
easier for parties to circumvent arbitration agreements than if the court was to adopt a higher objective 
threshold or a bona fide test.118  
The Court of Appeal states that claims “that New Zealand is out of step with the rest of the world 
on this issue…appear to be overstated.”119 Canadian and South African legislation are referred to in 
order to prove this point.120 However the widely accepted approach to stay applications is considered 
to be that formulated at the New York Convention and adopted in the UNCITRAL’s Model Law on 
Commercial Arbitration.121 The New York Convention does not include the added words.122 Further 
Canada and South Africa seem to require higher levels of proof before they will exercise their 
discretion and allow court proceedings. As discussed above a number of factors guide the South 
African courts, one of them being pacta servana sunt, the principle that agreements are to be kept.123 
In Canada the requirement for the plaintiff’s claim to have a “high prospect of success” seems to 
                                                             
114 Law Commission Improving the Arbitration Act 1996 (NZLC R83, 2003) at [245]. 
115 See Zurich v Cognition, above n 5, at [68]-[69]. 
116 Ibid at [78]. 
117 See Zurich v Cognition, above n 5, at [8]. 
118 The bona fide test will be discussed further below in section 6B and 6C. 
119 See Zurich v Cognition, above n 5, at [73]. 
120 Ibid. 
121 See above in section 3A and Kalderimis and Skelton, above n 71, at 282. 
122 See above in section 3A. 
123 See above at section 3E. 
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demand more from the plaintiff before court proceedings will be allowed.124 This reluctance to allow 
proceedings is also evidenced by the Canadian and South African academics and law commission 
sources which are currently recommending law reform in favour of curtailing the court’s ability to 
allow proceedings.125 The decision in Zurich is clearly against the general trend favouring the 
independence of arbitration. 
Admittedly the need for consistency between arbitral regimes internationally is weakened by the 
facts of the case. Despite one party being from Australia, both parties chose New Zealand as the seat 
of arbitration and that New Zealand arbitration rules and law would apply to the policy.126 It is 
therefore difficult for either party to claim that the New Zealand courts are not an appropriate forum 
to hear the dispute. Their arbitration agreement shows that both parties have a strong connection to 
New Zealand. Such a connection is typically required to defeat challenges to the jurisdiction of New 
Zealand courts.127 Furthermore the Court recognises the value of autonomy and hold that imposing the 
Court’s jurisdiction is consistent with the wishes of the parties as expressed in their agreement.128    
It may be that the Court does not appreciate the delay that may result from the ease at which 
summary judgment may be obtained in relation to disputes referred to arbitration. Kalderimis and 
Skelton document the significant delay which has befallen the parties in Zurich:129 
 
In Zurich, the plaintiff’s summary judgment application was filed on 9 March 2012, with a procedural 
hearing held on 27 November 2012. The Court of Appeal’s decision was heard in February 2013, with a 
decision given on 29 May 2013. Leave to appeal is presently being sought before the Supreme Court. And all of 
this before the defendant’s protest to jurisdiction is heard, a substantive summary judgment hearing is held 
(presently scheduled for September 2013), a decision given – and, if unsuccessful – the parties are then required 
to commence arbitration.  
It seems therefore that seeking summary judgment may not always be “a timely and efficient 
means of resolution” when the parties have a prior arbitration agreement.130 If the policy of the added 
words is to prevent the parties to be “forced into the expense of full scale arbitration” it may be that 
seeking summary judgment is not always a reliable alternative.131  
 
                                                             
124 See above at section 3D. 
125 See above at section 3D and 3E. 
126 See Zurich v Cognition, above n 5, at [10] and [74]. 
127 See Wing Hung Printing Co v Saito Offshore Pty Ltd, above n 84, at [30]. 
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For commercial reasons it may have been in the interests of Zurich to have kept its dispute with 
Cognition confidential. Cognition’s summary judgment application and the subsequent review has 
now meant that this opportunity is gone. The existence of a dispute between the parties has been 
reported in the New Zealand Law Reports and has been the subject of argument in open court.132 
 
VI PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO ARTICLE 8(1) 
 
It is clear from the foregoing analysis that New Zealand’s current approach to summary judgment 
applications on a matter subject to an arbitration agreement is unsatisfactory. It is necessary therefore 
to formulate alternative approaches to the question of judicial intervention which are theoretically, 
comparatively and practically sound. Maybe most importantly a distinction must be made between 
international and domestic arbitration. 
 
A Deleting the Added Words 
Deleting the added words would be for New Zealand to follow developments in Malaysia, England 
and Singapore in order to meet its obligations under the New York Convention.133 This may 
encourage international commerce being conducted in New Zealand. The added words represent the 
defeasibility of arbitration agreements with New Zealand parties and a threat to international parties 
that they may be answerable to New Zealand courts, something they may not have directly bargained 
for.134 Alternatively international parties may have an unfair advantage over New Zealand residents in 
subsequent court proceedings because it may be easier for them to prove that New Zealand is not the 
appropriate forum to hear their dispute as discussed above.135  
The independence of arbitration is realised by deleting the added words. It respects the autonomy 
of the parties in choosing that an arbitral tribunal will be the sole determiner of their dispute.136 It may 
be that domestic parties find comfort in being able to resort to the courts if they are not satisfied with 
their arbitration. Domestic parties do not have the same jurisdictional concerns as international parties 
and the need for consistency between arbitral regimes is not relevant. 
 
 
                                                             
132 Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd v Cognition Education Ltd [2013] 3 NZLR 219 (CA). 
133 See above at section 3. 
134 See Zurich v Cognition, above n 5, at [26]. 
135 See above at section 4B. 
136 See Zurich v Cognition, above n 5, at [26]. 
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  B The Subjective Approach  
The subjective approach would refer bona fide albeit unarguable disputes back to arbitration. This 
approach argued for unsuccessfully in Zurich addresses the potential for defendants to abuse the 
court’s deference to the arbitration agreement.137 It recognises that is not appropriate to stay 
proceedings when a party is simply trying to prolong the resolution of the dispute in a way which 
exhibits bad faith. At the same time this approach upholds the autonomy of the parties by deferring to 
the arbitral tribunal’s assessment of the merits of a dispute.  
While this approach fits well with the general movement towards limiting judicial intervention, 
there are practical problems with adopting a bona fide test. Without first considering the merits of the 
dispute, it may be difficult for judges to distinguish between a party who genuinely thinks that there is 
a dispute and a party who is merely asserting a dispute for the purpose of delaying the resolution of 
the matter.138 Inevitably there are cases where a matter is so indisputable that the only inference is that 
a party is acting in bad faith if its claims that there is a genuine dispute to be referred to arbitration.139 
It will be difficult to identify such cases without first establishing that the matter is objectively 
indisputable. A bona fide test which does not take into account the merits of a dispute is therefore an 
artificial limitation on the discretion of the courts to stay proceedings and has the potential to be 
abused by parties seeking to prolong the resolution of the dispute. 
The Court of Appeal in Zurich refers to developments under the Model Law to suggest that even 
without the added words it is likely that a court has the power to engage in a good faith inquiry.140 
This would make it unnecessary to explicitly spell out a bona fide test. The Court was likely referring 
to Article 2 A(1) of the Model Law which requires an interpretation of the Law consistent with the 
observance of good faith.141  
C The Heightened Objective Approach 
In Canada the courts will not stay proceedings on a matter subject to an arbitration agreement 
unless the claimant’s claim has a “high prospect of success.”142 This approach is based on the 
jurisdictional theory because it necessarily allows the court to assess the merits of a dispute referred to 
arbitration. It seems to place a higher premium on the parties’ decision to refer their dispute to 
                                                             
137 See Zurich v Cognition, above n 5, at [7]. 
138 See Cognition v Zurich, above n 1, at [49]. 
139 Merrill Lynch Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc v Prem Ramchand Harjani [2009] SGHC 133 at [21]. 
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141 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (United Nations Publications, Vienna, 
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arbitration than the “arguable defence” test. This is because it requires a higher standard of proof 
before it allows a party to avoid its arbitration agreement.  
 
Adopting the Canadian approach would mean that the courts would be more likely to stay court 
proceedings and refer the parties to arbitration, a result which would give some confidence to 
international parties making arbitration agreements with New Zealand parties. However this test may 
undermine a main purpose for why parties apply to the courts to avoid an arbitration agreement, 
namely the hope of a timely resolution of the matter. A higher standard of proof may in some cases 
require additional evidence to be produced and this will likely prolong the dispute resolution.  
 
D Optional Application of the Added Words 
It has been suggested that the added words should be moved to the Second Schedule of New 
Zealand’s current Arbitration Act.143 The added words if in Schedule 2 would only apply to 
international arbitration if the parties so agreed.144 For domestic arbitrations, the added words would 
apply automatically unless the parties agree otherwise.145  
This approach would align New Zealand with the developing autonomy theory of international 
arbitration. The autonomy theory recognises that the national laws of the seat of arbitration should not 
be mandatory on parties to an arbitration agreement.146 An interesting question is whether this 
approach conflicts with New Zealand’s obligations under the New York Convention. As outlined 
above, the treaty requires that states enforce international arbitration agreements except in the 
specified circumstances which do not include the added words.147 However the optional application of 
the added words is not inconsistent with the treaty’s purpose of preventing contracting states from 
impose onerous requirements before recognising arbitration agreements.148 
If an international party consents to the application of the added words it would be difficult to 
them to turn around and say that the New Zealand courts are a forum non conveniens. This is because 
of the acceptance of the jurisdiction of the New Zealand courts implicit in the advertent inclusion of 
the added words in their arbitration agreement. This protects New Zealand residents against 
jurisdictional challenges and provides clarity to international parties uncertain about the defeasibility 
of arbitration agreements with New Zealand parties. The opt-out presumption in Schedule 2 
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represents an understanding that the independence of international parties is likely to be preferred 
while respecting the autonomy of the parties to choose otherwise.   
The opt-out requirement for domestic arbitration agreement recognises that jurisdictional issues 
and nationality differences are not as relevant to domestic parties. This is to be preferred to having 
mandatory rules for domestic arbitration agreements as is the case in England and Singapore.149 Such 
an approach would disadvantages parties to a domestic arbitration whose particular concerns such as 
confidentiality are best met by greater independence from the judicial system.    
VII CONCLUSION 
Zurich v Cognition raised questions over the extent to which the courts should allow a party avoid 
their agreement to arbitrate under art 8(1). There are three reasons why this is an unfortunate 
development in New Zealand arbitration law.  
Firstly extending judicial control over arbitration cannot justifiably extend to international 
arbitration. The autonomy theory of arbitration demonstrates that the independence of international 
arbitration is necessary for parties to reconcile the differences between their nationalities.  
Secondly the independence of international arbitration is recognised internationally. If New 
Zealand allows their courts a greater level of discretion over staying proceedings brought in relation to 
international arbitration then it will invite jurisdictional challenges and the perception that arbitration 
agreements with New Zealand parties are easily defeasible.  
Thirdly encouraging parties to seek summary judgment instead of persisting with their arbitration 
will mean that the party seeking to stay proceedings will be disadvantaged. The benefits of arbitration 
such as efficiency, confidentiality and suitability are challenged and potentially defeated when one 
party decides to bring court proceedings. 
It is therefore necessary to formulate an alternative approach to staying applications for summary 
judgment on a matter subject to an arbitration agreement. The independence of arbitration is best 
served by moving the added words in art 8(1) to schedule 2 of the Arbitration Act where they would 
apply to international arbitration optionally. This recognises that allowing the court to assess the 
merits of a dispute referred to international arbitration is unusual. It legitimises judicial intervention 
by requiring the consent of international parties first. The opt-out basis for domestic arbitration 
agreements recognises that jurisdictional issues and nationality differences are not as relevant to 
domestic, but it nevertheless respects the autonomy of parties to agree otherwise. 
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